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STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
This dissertation is structured to analyse the amendments to sections 15 and 16 of the 
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 dealing 
with consensual underage sexual activity. Moreover this dissertation examines the judgement 
in Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children and Another v The Minister of Constitutional 
Development and Others 2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) in order to fully appreciate South Africa‟s 
position with regard to decriminalising the aforementioned sections and how the ruling lead 
to a new amended Act. A further aim of the writer is to evaluate some of the changes 
contained in the amendment Act and to determine its alignment with the ruling of the 
Constitutional Court. 
Chapter one of the dissertation is entitled “introduction.” The chapter comprises of a broad 
outline of the purpose of the present study. The topic that follows thereafter provides a 
background of the study. 
The second chapter is entitled the “Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) 
Amendment Act 32 of 2007 (herein referred to as the „SORMA‟).” The chapter comprises of a 
discussion on sections 15 and 16 in context. Thereafter the chapter proceeds into a detailed 
critical analysis of the above mentioned sections. The chapter closes with the defences 
available and gives the reader an insight into the reasons for civil society raising concerns 
about these specific provisions which caused the matter to be taken to the courts in the Teddy 
Bear Clinic case.  
The third chapter is entitled “The Teddy Bear Clinic case”. The case under discussion reflects 
upon the important orders of the Constitutional Court and the decriminalisation of the 
impugned provisions. The chapter discusses the facts of the case, the arguments made by the 
applicant, the response from the deponents, the High Court findings, the Constitutional court 
findings and the orders made to Parliament to correct the defects. 
The fourth chapter is entitled “Criminal law (sexual offences and related matters) 
Amendment Act 5 of 2015 and it comprises the climax of the dissertation whereby the 
Constitutional Court in the Teddy Bear Clinic case declared sections 15 and 16 
unconstitutional and the defects were cured by the enactment of the said amended Act. The 
chapter mentions the changes to SORMA and how these changes align with the constitutional 
court ruling. The chapter also comprises the mandatory reporting obligations of the health 
professionals. 
The final chapter, chapter five is entitled “summary of arguments, conclusions and 
recommendations”. I refer back to the previous chapters in order to extract arguments and 
this final chapter is brought together by such arguments and observations to create a 
comprehensive conclusion. 
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1.1 Purpose of the study 
 
Child rights advocates have welcomed the ruling overturning parts of the Sexual 
Offences Act, which they say “was out of step with reality”. 
1 
In the year 2013, most 
parents‟ fears became reality when consensual sex between teenagers was decriminalised. 
The consent to sex for children between the ages of 12-16 years has been a hotly debated 




Both the High court and the Constitutional court held in the Teddy Bear Clinic 
3
 case that the 
criminalisation of sections 15 and 16 of SORMA was invalid and inconsistent with the 
Constitution. 
4
 This dissertation examines the aftermath of the ruling in Teddy Bear Clinic 
case in order to fully appreciate South Africa‟s position with regard to decriminalising the 
aforementioned sections. The ruling lead to a new amended Act. A further aim of the writer is 
to evaluate some of the changes contained in the amendment Act and to determine its 
alignment with the ruling of the Constitutional Court. 
 
 
1.2 Background to the study 
 
Section 14 of the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957,
 5 
criminalised sexual intercourse with a 
child under the age of 16 years („statutory rape‟). The Sexual Offences Act was originally the 
Immorality Act which prohibited prostitution, keeping of a brothel and also criminalised 





that it was offence under the act for any male to have or attempt to have intercourse with a 
girl under the age of 16 years and for any female to have or attempt to have unlawful carnal 




 JA Du Preez „Decriminalising consensual sex‟ (2013) available at http://www.sajbl.co.za/article-consensualsex;  accessed on 5 April 2015. 
2
 See (note 1). 
3 
The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children and Another v Minister of Constitutional Development and another 2014 (2) SA 168 (CC); 
   
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2013: Accessed on 2 April 2016. 
4
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; the relevant sections pertaining to the rights to dignity (s10), privacy (s12) and the  
   „best interest of the child‟(28(2) enshrined in the Bill of Rights that if adversely affected results in a violation of Constitutional Rights and  
    subsequently this is inconsistent with the Constitution. The discussion in chapter 3 and 4 relates. 
5
 23 of 1957, s14. 
6
 5 of 1927, s1. 
7 




 indicates that the most notable offences in this category of („statutory rape‟), includes 
acts of indecency by a male with under aged males, acts of indecency by females with under 
aged females and immoral or indecent acts with under aged persons. Section 14(1) (b) of the 
Sexual Offences Act provided that it was an offence for a male person to attempt or have 
unlawful carnal intercourse 
9 
with a boy under the age of 19 years. It was also an offence for a 
female person to attempt or have unlawful carnal intercourse with a boy under the age of 16 
years, or to commit an immoral or indecent act with a girl under the age of 19 years.
10
 
Effectively this set the age of consent to sexual intercourse at 16 years for both males and 
females in a heterosexual context. However with regards to a homosexual context the age 
limit was 19 years. This inconsistency with regards to the age to consent in the Sexual 
Offences Act was highlighted by the South African Law Commission (SALC),
 11
 in their 
2002 report, together with the following aspects of defences. The Commission final proposal 
on the age of consent to sexual penetration was that it should be set at 16 years of age, 




The Sexual Offences Act also identified defences that would have excluded the unlawfulness 
of the accused‟s conduct. This included defences such as implying that the child was a 
prostitute at the time of the offence or that the accused was a first time offender and was 
younger than 21 years was raised.
12 
The accused could have also raised the defence of being 











G Kemp… et al  Criminal Law in South Africa 2ed (2015) 368-369.
 
9 
23 of 1957, s14 (1) (b) defines unlawful carnal intercourse as; sexual intercourse otherwise than husband and wife. 
10
 23 of 1957, s14 (1); the penalty was imprisonment for a period not exceeding six years with or  
     
without a fine not exceeding R12 000 in addition to such imprisonment in the context of „immoral or indecent‟ acts in a homosexual  
     context, the age limit was set at 19 years of age.  
11
 The South African Law Commission Report on Sexual Offences Project 107 (December   2002) para.3.7.4; available at   
      
http://www.dog.gov.za/salc/reports.htm accessed on 3April 2016. 
12
  Kemp ( note 8; 369), first time offender gets some leniency depending on age meaning no involved in criminal activities. 
13







SALC wanted to retain the essence of section 14 of the Sexual Offences Act, however 
proposed that the defences should be limited in respect of criminal conduct of sexual 
penetration of a person under the age of 16 years against criminal conduct of an indecent act 
with a person under 16 years.
14  
 However SALC recommended that the defence of the 
accused being deceived into believing the child between the ages of 12-16, was over the age 
of 16 years still remained available.
15 
The SALC was cognisant of the reality of teenage 
sexual experimentation thus opted for criminalisation of the conduct of an accused who was 
more than three year older than the under- age person of 16 years with whom he committed 
an indecent act not an act of sexual penetration.
16 
In 2004, the SALC drafted the Sexual 
Offences Bill which proposed two options regarding sexual conduct with under-age children  
namely: (i) criminalising acts of sexual penetration and sexual violation with children below 
the age of 16; or (ii) criminalising acts of sexual penetration and sexual violation with 





The draft Bill became the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment 
Act 32 of 2007 (SORMA), 
18
 after the Sexual Offences Act was repealed and replaced. The 



















See note 11; at  para.3.7.4 
15 
If the victim is under 12 then the conduct is rape even if the accused is also under 12; SALC Project 107 note 11  at  para. 3.4.7,  
     
also see note 12 and 13. 
16
 Ibid 11 
17
 see note 11, at para. 3.7.5-3.7.7. 
18 










 defined criminal behaviour in the context of children as follows:  
 
“Consensual sexual acts with certain children, sexual exploitation and sexual grooming of 
children, exposure or display of or causing exposure or display of child pornography or 
pornography to children and using children for pornographic purposes or benefiting from 
child pornography, compelling or causing children to witness sexual offences, sexual acts 
or self-masturbation and exposure or display of or causing exposure or display of genital 




Chapter 3 of SORMA comprised of sections 15-22 which dealt with sexual offences against 
children.
21 
The unique aspect of SORMA was the comprehensive chapters dealing with 
sexual offences against children only.
22   
The focus of this discussion following will deal 
specifically with the provisions of sections 15 and 16 of SORMA. 
 
 
2.1 Section 15 of Act 32 of 2007 
 
Section 15 of SORMA dealt with acts of consensual sexual penetration prior to the new 
Amendment Act 5 of 2015. 
23 
Section 15 of  SORMA is defined as; “a person who commits 
an act of sexual penetration with a child, under 16 years of age, is guilty of a crime, even 
though the child may have consented to the act being performed.”  
 
It is important for the purposes of clarity at this stage to define the word „child‟ in the 
definition. 
24 
Section (1) (1) of SORMA defines the word child as follows: „Child‟ means, a 
person under the age of 18 year and with reference to section 15 and 16 respectively, a person 
12 years or older but under 16 years of age. Snyman
25 
reiterates that perhaps the most 
important of sexual offences is sexual intercourse with children under the age of 16 years 
even when they consent. 
_____________________________ 
19 
32 of 2007, s15. 
20
 Kemp (see note 8, 369) and see also chapter 3 of Act 32 of 2007, „flashing‟ defined by Urban Dictionary  as „revealing your private parts  
     to anybody‟. 
21
 see note 18, chapter 3, s15-22 dealt purely with sexual offences against children.
     
22
 see note 18, unique in terms of any legislation to have a chapter dealing with specific offence in an act. 
23 
see note 19, s15 before enactment of Amendment Act 5 of 2015. 
24 
note 18, s(1)(1) defines the word child; and see also note  4, s28(2).  
25 




The elements required to satisfy a crime in this regard was, the unlawful and intentional 




indicated that this is a very important crime and emphasised that the crime under 





sexual penetration of a child between the ages of 12-16 years was criminalised, because such 
a child was not mature enough properly to appreciate the consequences of sexual acts, 
especially sexual penetration of a female by a male.
28
 Section 15 stretched much further than 








The penetration also 
included being performed with any other part of the body such as a finger, toe or sex toy, a 
stick or the genital organs of an animal.
31
 Section 15 of SORMA thus criminalised all 






2.2 Section 16 of the Act 32 of 2007 
 
Prior to the enactment of  SORMA , „consensual indecent assault‟ of children was not a 
specific offence.
33 
The common-law crime of  „indecent assault‟ did exist to be used in 
prosecutions that pertained to children under 12 years of age.
34
 Under  SORMA  the crime of 
„indecent assault‟ was repealed and the statutory offence of  „sexual assault or sexual 
violation‟ was introduced.
35 
 Sexual violation is defined in section 5 of SORMA as follows: 
„conduct of a sexual nature, short of sexual penetration, which would have fallen under the 





Snyman (note 25, 384). 
27
supra note 26,384. 
28 
note 26, 384, although the child offered consent, the child was incapable to understand his/her actions therefore  regarded as „incom- 
     
petent‟ to do so.
    
29 
note 18, „penetration of the child‟s vagina, anus, mouth,‟ as stated in the act amounts to penetration and also includes by means of fin- 
     
gers , toes and or objects even animal genitalia not only human genitals. 
30
note 28 above 
31 
supra note 30 
32 
supra note 30 
33 
Snyman (note 25,371); sexual violation‟ whereby it says the following: a person („(A‟) who unlawfully and intentionally sexually
   
violates a complainant („B‟) without the consent of  B, is guilty of an offence  of sexual assault.  
34
 supra note 33 
35
note 33, the crime of „indecent assault‟ not used again but instead sexual violation or sexual assault  was instituted. 
36 
Snyman (note 25,371) ,See  Snyman commentary on sexual assault; „the previous crime of indecent assault‟ crime was created in   




The crime of sexual assault or sexual violation includes non-consensual sexual conduct in 
respect of children.
37  
However  section 16 of SORMA was intended to criminalise all acts of 
consensual sexual violation committed by adults with children aged between 12-16 years. 
Section 16(1)
38
 creates the offence as follows; „a person 
 
(A) who commits an act of sexual 
violation with a child (B) is despite the consent of B to the commission of  such an act, guilty 
of the offence of having committed an act of consensual sexual violation with a child.‟ 
Snyman
 
indicated that the perpetrator must have met the following elements namely; the act 
must be an act of sexual assault or sexual violation, committed against a person aged 12-16 
years, with an unlawful intention.
39
 There must be a written authorisation from the Director 
of Public Prosecution to clarify the institution of criminal prosecution if both parties involved 









2.3 Critical Analysis of Section 15 and 16 
 
All legislation pertaining to children are enacted with the best interest of the child being 
paramount.
41
 The main purpose of sections 15 and 16 was to protect children against sexual 
exploitation.
42
 Children however are vulnerable to undue influence by adults and significantly 
older children with respect to sexual conduct.  The  protection of children against adults and 
not protection of children against themselves is the solution.
43 
 Civil society and the public 
reacted to the implementation of the law and found it unreasonable as studies have shown 








see note 18; s16. 
38
supra note 18; s 16, defines the crime of sexual violation  or sexual assault. 
39
 Snyman (see note 25, 387) 
40
 Burchell (see note 7,630), the legislative amendment dealing with the situation where both parties are children which will be discussed  
      
further under( 2.4.) under critical analysis of sections 15 and 16 and also see J v National   Director of Public Prosecutions 2014 (2)  
      SACR 1 (CC), The Director of public Prosecutions makes a decision on prima evidence (on face value) evidence, available at: 
      http://www.childjustice.org.za-protecting-child-offenders-testing-the-National-Register-of-sex-offeners-htm accessed on 18 May 2016. 
41
see note 4, s28 (2). 
42
 see note 18, s15 and 16. 
43
 C du Toit „Protection of children against adults „(unpublished article for the Centre of Child and Family Law, 2013), available at  
      
http://www.bhekisisa.org/article/2013-05-31-00-sexualoffences accessed on 17 May 2016. 
 
6 
While the legislation could be said to be honourable and noble, confusion reigned amidst the 
bizarre anomalies within its provisions. A specific anomaly which arises related to the 
situation where one of the parties was below the age of 16 years whereas the other was over 
16 years but only the older party is prosecuted.
  
The criminalisation of intercourse between 
two consenting children between 12-16 years has been criticised on the grounds that it is not 
abnormal for adolescents in this age group to experiment with sex and that such conduct is 
developmentally significant and normative.
44
 Child right‟s activists such as „RAPCAN‟ and 
CHILDLINE echoed these sentiments acclaimed by Snyman.
45
 Snyman was convinced that 
punishing adolescents for such conduct was incompatible with human rights enshrined in the 
Constitution.
 
 He further reiterated that, “children‟s rights to dignity, privacy, body and 
psychological integrity as well as the constitutionally recognised principle that a child‟s best 




The implementation of SORMA, section 15 and 16 respectively had been met with mixed 
feelings by advocacy groups whereby on the one hand some applauded the provisions while 
on the other hand many raised concerns.
47
 In light of this statement, it becomes necessary to 
highlight the major practical problems that the provisions proposed for consensual sexual 
activity in children between the ages of 12-16 years. Firstly, where two children where older 
than 12 years but younger than 16, engaged in consensual sexual activity, both the children 
were arrested and charged by the police.
48
 Section 15 criminalised the sexual intercourse 
between children who were over 12 years of age but younger than 16 years.
49
  Section 16 
criminalised any sexual activity other than penetrative sex between children who were 12 
years but younger than 16.
50  
This meant that a 16 year old girl that had sex with her 15 year 
boyfriend would be prosecuted alone whilst if the pair were both 15 years at the time of the 








Snyman (see note 25,384), Children‟s behaviour that is meaningful and regular or standard when they reach puberty to become  
    
sexually active as their bodies develop, feelings develop. This leads to holding hands, kissing and petting. 
45 
C Nomdo „Criminalising consensual sexual activities in SA‟ 2014 16(1) Children’s Rights Project Journal 3 available at  
      
http://www.mg.co.za/article/2013-01-16-grren-light-for-healthy-sexual-development, accessed on 02 July 2016. 
46
 Snyman op  cit  note 44, 384 and also see note 4, s28 (2) indicates that all children have inherent human rights ie, rights to  
     
Privacy, s14 dignity, s10 but most importantly „best interest of the child s28 (2)‟ must be upheld.
 
47
 S Nair   A critical evaluation of SORMA provisions (unpublished LLM Assignment, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, 2015) 13,  
     
available at http://www.nmmu.co.za/thesis/2013-05-30-critical-evaluation-of-sexual-offences-act accessed on 5 May 2016. 
48
Snyman (see note 25,384-385). 
49
See note 18, s15. 
50
See note 18, s16. 
51
 See note 18, s15 together with 56(2); „It must be remembered that in s15, which creates this crime, provides in subs 2(a) that if  
     




The provisions also appeared contradictory when juxtaposed with certain sections of 
SORMA.
52
 A case in point of the contradiction is evidenced where an obligation is placed on 
any person with knowledge that a sexual offence has been committed to immediately report 
such knowledge to the police.
53
 A legal framework that provided adolescents with a right to 
access reproductive medication including contraceptives at age 12, however had to report 
underage consensual sexual activity to the police. Strode 
54
 stated  that, “these conflicting 
branches of law placed doctors and the police in an invidious position as they had a duty to 
provide a service but had to report all sexual acts involving children.”
 
Society in the form of 
doctors, teachers and priest would then be prosecuted if they knew this information and failed 
to report. Child rights experts agreed that children were already uncomfortable with 
discussing their sexuality, so therefore children would now refuse to divulge any information 




The effects of sections 15 and 16 of SORMA and the mandatory reporting provisions in 
sections 54 (1) violated children‟s constitutional rights in particular, the best interest of the 
child principle.
56
 Our courts have also pronounced this principle in the Minister for Welfare 
and Population Development v Fitzpatrick and Others, 
57
 where Goldstone J, stated; “section 
28 requires that a child‟s best interests have paramount importance in every matter 
concerning the child.” However as the principle is broad it can only be given substance upon 
the discretion of the court.  The test applied is where the court weights the good and bad 
factors and arrives at a decision. Section 7 of the Children‟s Act however provided a standard 
and open-ended list of factors which would guide any person or organ of State involved in 
making decisions regarding a child. 
58
 SORMA was therefore automatically bound to apply 
these factors listed in section 7 of the Children‟s Act. Section 7 placed an obligation on any 
person or organ of State applying the best interest of the child principle to protect the child 










See note 47. 
53 
A Strode…et al “Amendments to the Sexual Offences Act dealing with consensual under-age sex, implications for Doctors” 2016, 6, 3 
     




Strode (see note  53,256-259). 
55
 J van Niekerk „the aftermath of the Teddy Bear Clinic case‟   You Magazine’ 12 May 2013, 15 
56
32 of 2007; ,s 54(1). 
57
2000 (7)  BCLR  713 (CC) at para.18. 
58
38 of 2005, s7 available at http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/a38-05-3-pdf accessed 10 December 2015. 
59
D Smythe…et al Sexual Offences Commentary Act 32 of 2007 (2011) 9-7. 
 
8 
How did SORMA, with specific reference to section 54, play out against the rights of the best 
interest of the child? In respect of section 54, the consensual sexual act is reported by the 
health professional to the police. This requires that the child be interviewed by the police and 
a statement obtained.
60
 Moreover the child would have to undergo a medical examination in 
which a Sexual Assault Evidence Collection Kit (SAECK), is used to extract forensic 
evidence in the form of semen or spermatozoa for deoxyribonucleic (DNA) profile testing.
61
 
This does lead to tension between the child‟s right to be protected from harm and the fact that 
the formal justice system may not be in the child‟s best interest as a way of exercising his or 
her right to participate in decisions concerning themselves. This is suggested in instances 
where the child refuses to make a statement to the police or testify in court and the child is 
forced into doing this as arrest and prosecution could not be avoided in respect of the 




SORMA as discussed in the former paragraph is bound by the Children‟s Act and the 
Constitution specifically sections 28(2), the best interest of the child principle.
63
 It further 
seeks to give effect to the rights enshrined in international law as the United Nations Charter 
on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC)
 64
 was ratified by South Africa in order to protect 
children from sexual violence through recognising the unlawful sexual acts against children 
and criminalising them. However sections 15 and 16 of SORMA failed to honour this 
obligation by criminalising regular or standard adolescent sexual behaviour. The child‟s right 
of being involved in all decisions pertaining to their wellbeing was infringed by the arrest, 
detention and prosecution as children do not have a final say in deciding whether an offence 
against them is prosecuted. As a result of exposure to the criminal justice system children 
were left ashamed, embarrassed, stressed, angry and regretful because their sexual activity 








see note 18; s54; Discussion on this by myself as an experienced detective within the FCS unit of the South African Police 
    
for 20 years. I investigated many cases under this legislation and unfortunately all victims have to make a statement personally 
    or else the case docket cannot be opened. Medical exam also compulsory for all sexual offences cases either at provincial  
    hospital if under 14 years and over 14 at the District Surgeons. 
61
supra  note 60, all police stations stock this sexual assault kit. The Medical Doctor examines the child and completes the J88 
    
medical
 
form and takes specimens of semen for analysis. This
 
is dispatched to the Forensic Science Laboratory in Pretoria.  
62
Smythe (see note 59, 9-8); discussion: where children refuse to be involved in the case, the court will decline to prosecute and  
    
divert the matter to social workers or alternate dispute resolution avenues for example NICRO. 
63
Smythe (see note 59, 9-7) and also see 38 of 2005, s7 (note 58). 
64
supra note 59, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child(UNCRC) is the most widely ratified human rights treaty in the  
    
world. The UNCRC was ratified by South Africa in 1995. One of the core provisions of the UNCRC is Art 3 which deals with the best 
    interest of the child principle. 
 
9 
Another contradiction that arose from these provisions of SORMA was the comparison with 
the Children‟s Act.
65   
The Children‟s Act provides that a child of the age of 12 and above 
may access condoms and contraceptives in confidence. However this was in contrast with the 
provisions in SORMA, whereby a child between the ages of 12-16 was prohibited from 
consensual sex, then why the need to access condoms and contraceptives when this behaviour 
is reported by health care givers to the police.
66 
In addition sections 15 and 16 offered no 
confidentiality to children engaging in sexual conduct as their sexual history was widely 











about his or her actual age. Section 56 (2) 
(a) of SORMA; provided a valid defence for a person, („accused‟) 
70 
charged with this crime. 
Child („Y‟) would have deceived person („X‟) into believing that („Y‟) was 16 years or older 
at the time of the alleged commission of the crime.
 
Primarily („X‟) must have „reasonably 
believed‟ this.
71 
  However this provision does not apply if („X‟) is related to the „victim‟.
72  
The second defence illustrated in section 56 (2) (b) of SORMA is that both the person‟s 
charged with the alleged crime were both children at the time of the alleged incident.
73  
This 
meant that both were between the ages of 12-16 years or that the age difference was not more 











38 of 2005, s134, part 3 of chapter 7, deals with access to contraceptives. 
66
 supra (see note 19), s 15 and 16 criminalised consensual sexual conduct in children aged 12-16 years and yet Children‟s Act  
    
 children in that age group to access contraceptives. Children are then reported if sexually active and requesting „condoms‟ in 
     confidence….see note  45, where activists realised this discrepancy and  said children  now don‟t want to disclose underage sex for fear  
    of being charged. 
67
Nomdo (note 45, 3). 
68
note 18, s56 (2) (a) and (b); also see Snyman (note 25,385). 
69
 Perpetrator‟ as defined by „Oxford Dictionary‟…„A person who commits a crime or does something that is wrong or evil, the person  
      
who commits the act against the child.  Perpetrators called a suspect when detained or accused in court standing trial. 
70
see note 69. 
71
 See Snyman  (note 25, 385) Words „reasonably believed‟ test is objective in the sense that a reasonable person in that circumstance  
     
would have had a belief that „Y‟was at least 16 years at time of offence…behaved in that same way, not merely looked like 16 years.  
72
 See note 18, s56 (3) for the meaning of the words: prohibited incest degrees of blood, affinity or an adoptive relationship not apply 
     
 if related to the child. 
73
Burchell  (see note 7, 630). 
74





criticised the scope of section 15 and 16 with regards to section 56 (2) (b) of 
SORMA.
 
 Section 56 (2) (b) regarded the fact that both children were under 16 year and the 
age difference between them was no more than two years at the time of the alleged 
commission of the sexual violation as a defence to the charge of sexual assault (violation) 
under section 16.
76 
In other words, the age difference or „close-in-age‟,
 77 
defence was only 
applicable to sexual assault (s16) and not made applicable under SORMA to sexual 
penetration (s15).
 
It is submitted that the writer is in agreement with Burchell‟s criticism of 
the provisions as children are experimental when they reach puberty therefore sexual conduct 
can occur from mere kissing and petting to full on sexual intercourse. Therefore the defence 
should have been applicable to both provisions as sexual assault can lead to sexual 
penetration and should not be treated in isolation. 
 
The element of unlawfulness and intention had to be present to result in a criminal offence. 
However, Snyman informs us that the element of „intention
‟78
; is not specifically mentioned 
in the definition as an element of crime,
 
although he indicates that it is implied in the words, 
whereby the accused „reasonably believed‟ that the child was 16 years and older.
79 
The use of 
the word „reasonable‟ brings an objective element into the inquiry which is purely 
subjective.
80
 The decision rests with the court on how the latter was interpreted. It was 
suggested by Snyman, that a wide interpretation of the word should be preferred because 
such an interpretation would have enabled the court to have reached a conclusion compatible 
to the general principles applied to intention.
81   
 
Sections 15 and 16 of SORMA  read with above provisions were subjected to a constitutional 
challenge in the high court based on the infringement of  fundamental rights of children to 
dignity, privacy, integrity and  upholding the best interest of the child.
82  
In essence, the 
criminalisation of consensual child sexual experimentation was the central issue before the 
high court.
83 
Having said that, it was not a surprise when child right‟s activist took the matter 
to court to challenge the constitutionality of the aforementioned provisions. The upcoming 
chapter will discuss the proceeding of the Teddy Bear Clinic case from the High Court all the 




Burchell  (see note 7,630 at para D (1). 
76
see note 68 above. 
77
 Burchell,( note 7,630); „close-in-age gap‟ is a single age gap which can be a year or 2 older than the younger child at the time of
  
     the alleged sexual conduct‟. Consensual or non-consensual sexual penetration or sexual violation of children under 12 years and an   
      adult is clearly and justifiably punishable. This form of criminality was subject of challenge in the Teddy Bear case. 
78
Snyman (see note 25,386 at para. 2(i). 
79
supra note 25,386 at para. 2(j). 
80
see note 25,387. 
81
supra note 80. 
82
see chapter  2  at  2.3. for  discussion. 
83
The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children and Another v Minister of Constitutional Development 73300/10(2013) ZAGPPHC 1  
     





The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and 




3.  Introductory Remarks 
 
The decision in the Teddy Bear Clinic 
84
 case is of particular importance as it the first 
decision where section 15 and 16 of SORMA was interpreted within a constitutional 
framework. This chapter discusses the salient facts of the case, the arguments made by the 
applicants and the respondents respectively, the High court Findings and finally the ruling 





3.1 The facts of the case 
 
The applicants, the Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children and RAPCAN together with 
amicus curiae ; Women‟s Legal  Centre Trust, Tshwaranang Legal Advocacy Centre and 
Justice Alliance of South Africa made an application against the Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development and The National Director of Public Prosecutions (the 
respondents) challenging  the constitutional validity of certain sections of  SORMA.
85
 The 
sections in particular were, section 15 of  SORMA, titled; consensual sexual penetration with 
certain children („statutory rape), section 16; titled consensual sexual violation with certain 
children („statutory sexual assault) and section 56(2) dealing with defences in respect of 
sections 15 and 16 of SORMA.
86 
 
The application arose from an incident that occurred at a high school involving four 
adolescents.
87
 Three males persons aged between 14-16 years were charged for alleged rape 
on a 15 year old female. The adolescents filmed themselves via their cell phones having 
sexual intercourse on the sports grounds at the high school in Johannesburg.
88
 The 
adolescents were all charged under section 15 of SORMA after the 15 year old female had 




 Teddy Bear Clinic supra note 83 
85
supra note 83, at para. 3-9
 
86
supra note 83, at para. 1.1-1.3 
87
supra note 83, para.10-12 
88
supra note 83, para.13 
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The National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) decided to change the initial charge of 
„rape‟ to „statutory rape‟ under section 15 when it was established that the adolescents had 
engaged in consensual sexual conduct.
89 
The NDPP later withdrew all charges and referred 
the matter for a diversion programme.
90
 The constitutional validity of sections 15, 16 and 56 
was then challenged by the applicants in the North Gauteng High Court. 
 
 
3.2 Arguments made by the applicants 
 
The applicants challenged the provisions of sections 15 and 16 of SORMA on the basis that 
criminalising sexual conduct violated their constitutional rights to dignity, privacy, integrity 




view was  that the provisions destroyed any 
prospect of confidentiality through its mandatory reporting obligations. 
93  
Moreover 
RAPCAN professed that children‟s normal healthy sexual experimentation was 
fundamentally violated when they are put through the criminal justice system and forced to 
divulge intimate details of their conduct.
94 
The argument of consequential reporting of 
children‟s sexual activity to the police directly violated their constitutional rights.
95  
 
A further argument raised by the applicants was the entry of the child offenders name in the 
National Register for Sex Offenders under s 50(1)(a)(i) of SORMA.
96 
 This was claimed to be 
a further direct violation of the accused rights to be treated in a cruel, inhumane and 
degrading manner in terms of section 12(1)(e) of the Constitution.
97  
Adolescents faced the 
reality of being imprisoned with paedophiles and other hardened criminals which resulted in 





supra note 83, at para. 10-1-10.3 
90
supra note 83 at para. 92; Diversion programmes are available for children who enter the justice system and Act 75of 2008  
    
allows the child to divert into a programme where reasonable to obtain useful skills. However this is not always possible as 
     the system is inundated and shortage of social workers available to run these programmes. A further discussion will be undertaken 
    later in chapter 4 and 5. 
91
see note 83, at para. 83, where the court mentions many case law namely; MEC for Education, Kwa-Zulu Natal v Pillay (2008(1) SA 
    
474 (CC), stating it was held in this case that adolescents are bearers of all rights no less than adults. It further said that courts recognise  




 Nondo ( see note 45) …RAPCAN is an non-government    organisation that stands for  „Resources Aimed at the Prevention of Child
 
Abuse and Neglect  registered in 1973 and their work include  primary, secondary and tertiary prevention approaches to child abuse; see also  
note 83, at paragraph 4-4.1 to 4.2 full discussion by the court on second applicant. 
93
supra note 83, at  para 4. 
94
supra note 83, at oara. 50. 
95
supra note 83, at para. 54. 
96
supra note 83, at para. 60. 
97
supra op cit note 96 and also see note 4 
98
 see note 83, para.60;  see  also SS Terblanche „Child Justice Act,Detailed consideration of Section 68 as a Point of departure 





The applicant‟s further challenged the provisions with regards to the reporting obligations on 
health care professionals to report consensual sexual conduct of children age 12-16 to the 
police.
99
 The provisions made it mandatory for any person who had knowledge that 
adolescents were engaging in consensual under-age sex to be reported to the police and 
failure thereof meant prosecution.
100 
It was submitted that children then lost faith in health 
care professionals because intimate details of their sexuality were exposed which resulted in 






The applicants argued that this provision was in contrast with the aims and objectives of an 
Act that claimed to help, support and protect children and enforce their best interests.
102  
The 
applicants relied on the evidence from two experts, Professor Alan Flisher
103
 who was a child 
and adolescent psychiatrist at the University of Cape Town and Ms. Gevers,
104 
a clinical 
psychologist specialising in child and adolescent mental health  in strengthening their 
arguments before the court. Their opinion was that intimate relationships between adolescents 
are developmentally normative and that it is usually within these relationships that 
adolescents explore a wide range of sexual behaviour.
105  
The experts concluded that the 
provisions of SORMA lead to feelings of fear, anxiety and regret which would discourage 














see note 83, at para. 24-26. 
100
see note 83,  at  para. 24-26, this topic is going to be discussed in more detail under- Mandatory Reporting Obligations in the following 
      
chapter 4. 
101
supra op cit note 100. 
102
supra note 83, at para. 26. 
103
supra note 83, at para. 48 until 62; The criminalisation of intercourse   between two consenting children 12-16 years has been
 
criticised  
on the grounds that it is not normal for adolescents in this age group  to experiment with sex and that such conduct is developmentally 
significant and normative.‟  In the judgement the court refers to  expert evidence of  Flisher and Gevers which reiterated and demonstrated 
that it is “developmentally normative for adolescents to  between ages 12-16 to engage in intimate relationships  where their evidence 
discussed on behalf of  applicants. 
104
supra note 103. 
105
see note 83, at para. 55. 
106
supra note 105, at para.55-60. 
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3.3 Arguments of the Respondents 
 
The respondent‟s main arguments in opposition to the applicants were that the impugned 
provisions did not violate any constitutional rights of children.
107 
 The respondents also 
specifically contended that the provisions of  sections 15 and 16 had to be considered against 
the backdrop of the Children‟s Act  as well as the Child Justice Act .
108 
 It was submitted that 
one of the aims of the Children‟s Act was to prevent children from being exposed to the 
negative effects of the criminal justice system by using processes more suitable to the needs 
of children and in line with the Constitution, one of which was the process of diversion.
109 
According to the respondents, the provisions of sections 15 and 16 did not create offences but 
merely conferred upon the National Director of Public Prosecution (NDPP)
 
or the Director of 
Public Prosecutions (DPP), the sole discretion as to whether or not to institute a prosecution 
where adolescents engaged in conducted that was provided for in the sections.
110
 As such the 
discretion conferred would determine whether a prosecution in fact ensues and accordingly 
the exercise of such prosecutorial discretion would be done in line with the provisions of the 





The respondents relied on  experts such as a gynaecologist, sexologist and a principal of a 
school who testified that sexually active adolescents should be protected against others and 
themselves.
112
  It was further submitted that adolescents faced the above risks due to their 
immaturity, irresponsibility, susceptibility to peer pressure and generally poor decision 
making.
113 
The respondent‟s argued that it was necessary to have the deterrent of criminal law 
to protect  adolescents from psychological harm as well as the risk of  social ills in the form 
of unwanted pregnancies, HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases.
114 
 In addition it was 
contended that decriminalisation would send out the message that sex between children was 




see note 83, at para. 56-63. 
108
supra note 107, at para. 62. 
109
see note 83, at para.62; the court mentioned that Act 75 of 2008 allows the Prosecutor to divert the matter involving a child who 
      
is alleged to have committed an offence if : a) the child acknowledges responsibility for the offence; b) the child has not been unduly 
      influenced to acknowledge responsibility and c): there is a prima facie case against the child and d) if the parent is present and 
     consents to diversion and finally e) the prosecutor indicates that the matter can be diverted. 
110 
see para. 67  
111




see para.57, where the respondents put forward this response but the court although diversion can take place there is still the 
      
early process of arrest, detention, questioning that already exposes adolescent to the justice system. 
114
see para.63, the use of the criminal justice system as a weapon to deal with sexuality would further marginalise children and effect 
      





3.4 The High Court Findings 
 
The impugned provisions which were consequently challenged in this application was those 
that criminalised consensual sexual activity between adolescents, the consequential reporting 
and registration as a sex offender requirements.
116 
The court agreed with the applicants 
submission that section 16, „sexual violation‟ was broadly defined in that it included every 
form of physical contact such as kissing and petting. 
117 
The court further stated that the wide 
definition of sexual violation under section 16 criminalises moderate sexual acts that children 
are involved in and therefore undermines the child‟s best interest.
118 
 
In response to the respondent‟s submission that children are not prosecuted for these crimes 
but are rather diverted, the court stated that children were still exposed to the criminal justice 
system by early processes involving the arrest, questioning by the police, statement taking 
and even detention that had already negatively labelled the child and infringed on his or her 
dignity.
119
 The court stated that the use of the criminal justice system as a weapon to deter 




Moreover the court agreed with the applicants that the criminalisation of consensual conduct 
had no influence on protecting children from adult sexual abusers.
121 
In essence the court held 
that the provisions ought to be interpreted as implying that an adult who engages in 
consensual sexual penetration or sexual violation with a child aged 12-16 will be guilty of an 
offence.
122 




The respondents relied on prosecutorial discretion and submitted that a bad decision could be 
submitted for a judicial review.
124 
 The respondents submitted that the bad decision should 
not be a subject of constitutionality. The court referred to S v Zuma
125
 which held that „the 
presumption of innocence cannot depend on the exercise of discretion.‟ 
 
The court held 
further that judicial review or prosecutorial discretion would seldom protect children from the 






see para. 26. 
118
see  para. 84-85. 
119




see para. 105. 
122
supra note 121 
123
see para. 107. 
124
see para. 89. 
125
1995 (2) SA 642 (CC), para. 28. 
126
see para. 90. 
 
16 
There is no legislative guideline available for prosecutors to decide to prosecute or not. In 
addition the task in opening a case docket is in fact the duty of the police. Further the court 
disagreed that prosecutorial discretion could save the constitutionality of the impugned 
provisions because there was no legislative guideline for sections 15 and 16 in place assisting 




The high court attempted to remedy the provisions by introducing a „close-in-age‟ defence to 
sexual penetration committed between children who are younger than 18 years or had an age 
difference of two years or less.
128 
The court affirmed the age differential proviso to section 16 
(statutory sexual violation) contained in section 56(2) (b).
129 
This considers taking into 
account the definition of a child, which is common under the age of 18 years.
130  
The purpose 
of such an age differential was to distinguish a youthful sexual predator from an innocent 





Further the court paid attention to the respondent‟s submission that the impugned provisions 
must be read against the backdrop of the Children‟s Act and the Child Justice Act. According 
to the respondents the general principles under the Children‟s Act, which govern the 
implementation of the impugned provisions included the following namely that all 
proceedings, actions, or decisions in a matter concerning a child must respect, promote and 
fulfil the child‟s  fundamental rights and the best interest of the child, subject to lawful 
limitation.
132
  This they said can be regarded as a constitutional safeguard and therefore it 
would be  incorrect to consider that the impugned provisions criminalise the sexual conduct 
of children without acknowledging the presence of these safeguards.
133
 However the court 
referred to section 28(2) of the Constitution, which provides that a child‟s best interest are of 
paramount importance in every matter concerning a child.
134
 In the Minister of Welfare and 
Population Development v Fitzpatrick and Others,
135
 the Constitutional Court held that 




see note above, at para. 90. 
128
see note 18, s56 (2) b) provides that whenever an accused person is charged with an offence under section 16, it is a valid defence  
      
to such charge to contend that both the accused persons were children and the age difference(gap) between them is not more than 




32 of 2007(see note 18, s1). 
131
see para. 36-37. 
132
see para. 63-63.1-63.4. 
133
see para. 64. 
134
supra op cit not above. 
135







The court held that in this regard, the evidence presented in this matter clearly indicated that 
the impugned provisions may cause the child harm as they constitute an unjustified intrusion 






Rabie J, held as follows:  
“To subject intimate personal relationships to the coercive force of the criminal law is to 
insert state control into the most intimate area of adolescents‟ lives, namely their personal 
relationships. Any legislation which does so must be carefully and narrowly crafted to 
infringe on these vital; constitutional rights as little as possible. Analysis of sections 15 and 
16 shows that these provisions do not properly balance children‟s rights to autonomy ,dignity 




Finally the court found that criminal offences which applied to consensual sexual conduct in 
previous cases have been found to be inconsistent with the fundamental right to dignity.
138 
Namely in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v Minister of Home 
Affairs and Others,
139
 the Constitutional court considered the validity of criminalisation of 
sodomy and held that, “ the criminal punishment of consensual sexual conduct is a form of 
stigmatisation which infringes the dignity of those targeted.” The court held hereto that those 
findings by the Constitutional Court are equally true of the criminalisation of consensual 
sexual conduct between children and that the impugned provisions also stigmatised and 




The High court upheld the contentions that were raised by the applicants and declared that 
sections 15 and 16 were invalid and inconsistent with Constitution insofar as they 





















2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) at para. 28, see para. 76. 
140




The following orders were made by Rabie J:  
 
“Section 15, section 16 and 56(2) (b) of SORMA are inconsistent with the Constitution as 
they criminalised consensual sexual conduct between the ages of 12-16 years. Further the 
court gave orders as to how the defects of the relevant sections 15 and 16 should be corrected 
respectively and declared how they should read. Section 15 should read as follows, a person 
(„A‟) who commits an act of sexual penetration with a child(„B‟) is, despite the consent of B 
to the commission of such an act, guilty of the offence of having committed an act of 
consensual sexual penetration with a child, unless at the time of sexual penetration (i) „A‟ is a 
child; or (ii) „A‟ is younger than 18 years old and „B‟ is two years or less younger than „A‟ at 
the time of the such conduct. In addition, section 16 should read as follows, a person („A‟) 
who commits an act of sexual violation with a child („B‟) is, despite the consent of „B‟ to the 
commission of such an act, guilty of the offence of having committed an act of consensual 





The application then went to the Constitutional Court for confirmation whereby the 
Constitutional Court interrogated the constitutional validity of criminalising consensual 




3.5 The Findings of the Constitutional Court 
 
The application for confirmation for a declaration of unconstitutionality came before the 
Constitutional Court in May 2013.
143
  Khampepe J commenced by making it clear that the 
court views children as individual bearers of all fundamental rights entrenched in the 
Constitution.
144  
The court further reiterated that children will experience unhealthy sexual 












The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children and Another v Minister of Constitutional Development 2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) avail- 
      
able at www.google.com/search?CCT12/13(2013)ZACC35,2013(12)BCLR1428; accessed on 10 April 2015. 
144
see note 143, para.55  
145
see note 143, para. 78., Khampepe J, indicates that in terms of s172 (1) of the Constitution obliged to declare the impugned prov- 
      




The court ruled that when adolescents are publicly exposed to criminal investigation and 
prosecutions they are stigmatised and disgraced.
146   
The court found that it had to agree with 
the applicants that even a prospect of diversion could not save the impugned provisions.
147   
It 
was held that although this might be the case, the child still has to disclose with various state 
institutions when they engaged in „normative developmental conduct,‟
148 
which left children 
humiliated and ashamed. 
 
 
The court rejected the trial‟s court approach of „reading in‟ an extension of the „close-in-age‟ 
defence of section 15 and regulating the wording  to cover an under 18 years old.
 149
 The 
court had insufficient evidence to decide that sections 15 and 16 of SORMA had the same 
constitutional implications for 16 and 17 year olds as they did for adolescents and was 
therefore not prepared to read in a „close-in-age‟ defence or confirm the high court‟s 
judgement in this respect.
150 
 The Constitutional court proposed in this respect that the 
legislature should „reconsider the close-in-age defence‟ and whether it should be applied to 




The Constitutional Court decided unanimously in favour of the judgement rendered by 
Khampepe J, that sections 15 and 16 of SORMA had unjustifiably and unreasonably 
infringed the constitutional right to dignity, privacy and „best interest of the child.‟
152 
An 
analysis of the impugned provisions proved that there was an insertion of state control into 
the intimate areas of adolescents lives therefore this did not balance the rights to autonomy, 
privacy and dignity. The court held that sections 15 and 16 was therefore inconsistent with 
the Constitution to the extent that they criminalised consensual conduct of children between 









see note 143, at paragraph 118 
147
see para. 119. 
148
see para. 98, „normative developmental conduct‟; the criminalisation of intercourse between consenting children 12-16 years has been  
      
criticised on the grounds that it is not normal for adolescents in this age group to experiment with sex and that such conduct  
       is developmentally significant and normative. In the high court judgment the court referred to expert witnesses Flisher and Gevers 
      that it is developmentally normative for adolescents to engage intimate relationships, the court even gave statistics. 
149
see para. 50 where the court mentions this and says; „discuss later‟ and does so in para.78-109, the court did not accept the high  
       
court decision in this regard and refused to confirm it. 
150
supra note 149. 
151 
see para. 78. 
152





The court held that:  
 Sections 15 and 16 of the SORMA was declared invalid to the extent that they 
imposed criminal liability for sexual offences on children under 16 years of age;
154
 
 The declaration for invalidity was suspended for a period of 18 months from the date 
of the judgement to allow Parliament to correct the defects;
155
 
 From the date of the judgement there was to be a moratorium on all investigations 
into, arrests made, prosecutions of and criminal and ancillary proceedings; 
regarding sections 15 and 16 offences, inclusive of the duty to report such sexual 
conduct between children 12-16 years under section 54 of SORMA, until Parliament 
had corrected the act;
156 
 Convictions or diversions orders made as a result of such offences committed by 
children 12-16 years in terms of sections 15 and 16 were to be expunged from the 






 The Constitutional Court ruling instructed the lawmakers to correct the above legislation  
  whereby after much time had passed, the Amendment Act 5 of 2015 came into operation  
  in July 2015. The following chapter follows this enactment and puts forth a relevant      



















see para. 117(1). 
155
 see para. 117(2). 
156 
see para. 117(3). 
157
see para. 117(4); consulted  P Stevens „Recent Developments in Sexual Offences against children-A Constitutional perspective‟ 2013 






Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act, 
Amendment Act 5 of 2015 
 
 
4.1 Introductory Remarks 
 
In July 2015, the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters (Amendment Act, 
Amendment Act 5 of 2015
158
 (herein referred to as the Amendment Act)
 
came into 
operation with the aim of amending SORMA, following the Constitutional Court 
judgment in the Teddy Bear Clinic case.
159 
 The court had ordered Parliament to amend 
certain provisions in SORMA and bring it in line with the Constitution and this was done 
with the birth of the above legislation.
160 
This chapter evaluates some of changes 
contained in the Amendment Act to determine its alignment with the ruling of the 
Constitutional Court. In addition it will consider how the changes will impact the 
reporting obligations of health providers by decriminalising consensual sexual conduct 




















5 of 2015 See also (note 18); See also all academic writers who commented on the new legislation in Burchell (note 7,632), 
              
 and Kemp( note 8, page 370, paragraph 28.14.3.1 and P Mahery „Reporting sexual offences involving child patients: What is 
             current law following the Constitutional Court judgement?‟ (2014) 1 South African Journal of Bioethics and the Law 
              26-29 available on http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/38977-act-5-of-2015-criminal-law accessed 10 February 2016. 
         159 
see note 143, paragraph 117(1-5) 
         
160 




4.2 Amendment Act 5 of 2015 
 
The Preamble to the Amendment Act provides that the primary objective of sections 15 
and 16 of SORMA is to protect children who are between the ages of 12-16 from adult 
sexual perpetrators. This provision remains unaffected by the Constitutional Court 
judgement and consequently also does not lower the age of consent in respect of sexual 




The amended section 15(1)
162
 of SORMA define „statutory rape‟ as follows: 
(1) A person  („A‟) who commits and act of sexual penetration with a child („B‟) who is 
12 years of age or older but under the age of 16 years is, despite the consent of B to 
the commission of such an act, guilty of the offence of having committed an act of 
consensual sexual penetration with a child, unless A, at the time of the alleged 
commission of such an act, was – 
a) 12 years of age or older but under the age of 16; or 
b) Either 16 or 17 years of age and the age difference between A and B was not more 
than two years. 
 
 
The amended section 16(1)
163 
of SORMA defines the crime of statutory sexual assault as 
follows: 
(1) A person („A‟) who commits and act of sexual violation with a child („B‟) who is 12 
years of age or older but under the age of 16 years is, despite the consent B to the 
commission of such an act, guilty of the offence of having committed an act of 
consensual sexual violation of a child, unless A, at the time of the alleged 
commission of the act, was- 
a) 12 years of age or older but under the age of 16 years: or  
b) Either 16 or 17 years of age and the age difference between A and B was not more 












see note 123 a full discussion under chapter 3 above on the High Court‟s finding and Note 143 on the CC. findings i.e. age of 
 
       consent not lowered to 12 but remains at 16 years. 
162
see note 158, s15 (1); new  amended definition. 
163
see note 158, s16 (1). 
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4.3 Analysis of the amendments contained in the Amendment Act 
 
First and foremost in amending the legislation the starting point was the definition of the 
word „child‟ in section (1) of the Amendment Act.
164 
 Section(1) of SORMA had two 
different definitions of a „child‟.  Firstly a  „child‟ is defined as a person under the 18 
years old and secondly for the purposes of sections 15 and 16 was considered a person 
older  than 12 but younger than 16 years.
165 
 The Amendment Act removed the latter part 
of the definition and created a comprehensive definition to cover any person under the 




 concurs  that there is a similarity between SORMA and the 
Amendment Act namely where the age of consent to sex or sexual activity remains 16 
years. Mahery
167
 says that by inserting the age requirement directly into the relevant 
sections of 15 and 16, the lawmakers made it easier for professionals and state institutions 
to understand and apply. Firstly with regards definition of a „child‟ the  writer is in 
agreement with Mahery in that the SORMA was a difficult piece of legislation to read 
and to the understand.  Having a different definition to the Children‟s Act created some 
confusion for state institutions. The amendment allows for one plain and simple 
definition, that any person under the age of 18 years is regarded as a „child,‟ thus making 
it easy for children, parents, police and caregivers to understand.  
 
 
Moreover section 56(2) (b) of SORMA had significantly impacted on the course of the 
amendments in the Amendment Act.
168
 Section 56(2) (b) was one of two defences 
available under SORMA. Snyman
169 
explains that according to the aforementioned 
section this was a valid defence for somebody charged under section 16(sexual violation), 
to allege that both the persons involved were children i.e. ages 12-15 years and or the age 
difference between them was not more than two years at the time of the alleged 
commission of the offence.
170








See note 18, s (1) (1) defines a „child‟, the preamble defines the child.  
165
see note 18 whereby the „child‟ is defined as being under 18 years and for the purposes of S15 and 16 any person under 16 years 
166
Strode   (see note 53, 256-259). 
167
P Mahery „Reporting sexual offences involving child patients: What is the current law following the Constitutional Court  
      
judgment?‟ (2014) 1 South African Journal of Bioethics and the Law 26-29. 
168
see note 73, initial discussion under 2.3 critical analyses of section 15 and 16 inclusive of defences and Rabie J, declared this  
       
section inconsistent with the Constitution under note 123. 
169
Snyman  (note 25) 385-386.  
170
Snyman (note 25), 385-386, the second defence under SORMA, (note 19) indicated that reasonably believed test is objective 
       
in the sense that a reasonable person in that circumstance would have had the belief that Y was at least 16 at the time of offence. 
171
see note 83, para.36. (Close in age disparity). 
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The original section 56(2)(b) of SORMA created an age gap defence for a perpetrator 
who was 16 or 17 years old at the time of committing a sexual „violation‟ against a 




The Amendment Act makes fundamental changes to the position of the 16 and 17 year 
old in this regard. 
173 
 The change means that it is no longer an offence if a 16 or 17 year 
old engages in a sexual act, either sexual penetration or sexual violation, with an 
adolescent aged between 12-15 years, provided they are not more than two years older 




submits that this intrusion is in line with the 
proposal made by the applicants in the Teddy Bear Clinic case, who argued that 
adolescents aged 15-17 are part of the same peer group given they complete grades 10-12 
together.
 
 The peer group scenario would insinuate that the relationship was normal thus 
should not be criminalised. Strode and Mahery were in agreement that the amendment is 
broader than its original provision as it now covers both sexual violation and sexual 
penetration. 
176 
 Strode  further explains that the inclusion of the „close-in-age‟ defence 
brings our law in line with the approaches adopted in the UK, Canada and the USA.
177
 
Under SORMA, this defence did not serve as an automatic withdrawal of the charge, 
since the Public Prosecutor had a discretion.
 
The Amendment Act works differently in 
that when this defence is raised, no prosecution would ensue. However if that person is 
over that age gap then they have to be charged for the offence. 
 
The writer reiterates Strode‟s submission and it is agreed upon that 16 or 17 year olds are 
still children and often children find themselves in the same grades as learners who are 
two years older or younger than them. This also occurs in the sports field, children two 
years older or younger are placed in the same team. In addition as a country that ratified 








Snyman (note above 25, 385-386) and see also Burchell (note 7,630). 
173
see note 158, s15 (1) (b). 
174
see note 158, and also see Mahery note 158, page 5 and Kemp note 8, 373. 
175
See Strode note 53, 257; and also see note 83, at para. 44 where the 2nd applicant, shared same sentiments that children in that  
       
are younger than 2 or over 2 years apart in age can be categorised in same age bracket . 
176
see Strode (note 53, 211 and 257) and Mahery (note 158, 5), the second significant change introduced by the Amendment Act 
        
is that it replaces the original age gap defence with an age gap exception. Both agreed that this change is very significant.
  
177
 Strode (note 53, 257), while in some countries close-in-age defences are used to impose lighter penalties on adolescents 
        
in others such as SA such defences decriminalise the activity altogether. In recognition that the age of majority is 18, this 
        defence helps protect 16-17 year olds(who are still legally  children) from prosecution, as long as they are not more than 2-years  




Finally the Amendment Act did not change the age of consent for sex or sexual activity as 
it still remains at age 16 years.
178 
 Moreover non-consensual sexual intercourse with a 
child under 12 years still remains an offence as the child has no capacity to consent.
179
. It 
is submitted by the writer that the amendment to respond to the Constitutional Court 
ruling and remove the defects of the impugned provisions is applauded because it did not 
lower the age of consent and give adolescents‟ free reign in respect of sexual activity. 
Instead it created a more open and honest relationship in families and society. This allows 
adolescents to make truly informed choices on when to start exploring with their 
sexuality. It further re-affirmed the faith of children in the justice system that human 
rights are paramount and safeguarded and if infringed or violated, there is a right of 
recourse.  
 
The mandatory obligations regarding the reporting of any sexual offence against a child 
remains in place. Section 54 of SORMA, has not been amended and therefore there is still 
an obligation to report the commission of sexual offences against children.
180
 The 








 submits the following that consensual but underage sex was a criminal offence 
that had to be reported to the police. This was contradictory to the fact that other 
legislation provided that children from the age of 12 could access contraceptives and have 
termination of pregnancies yet consensual sex between adolescents remained a criminal 
offence.
183 
  “These conflicting approaches placed doctors, researchers and practitioners 
working with adolescents in and invidious position where they had a duty to provide 
adolescents with sexual and reproductive services but were required to report all sexual 






see Kemp (note 8), par. 28.14.3; „this development in criminal law does not mean that   the state encourages
 
premature 
        Consensual sexual conduct. 
179
 See   Kemp op cite note, 178; „a person younger than age of 12 is irrebuttably presumed to be incapable of consenting to a  
       
sexual act; see s57(1) , see also 1(3)(a)(iv)„ notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law contained a male 
        or female person under the age of 12 is incapable of consenting to a sexual act. 
180
see note 83, at para. 54, the High Court held that section 54 was not brought in as a challenge by the applicants in the case but 
       
the court could foresee that this matter would be challenged in the near future due to its implications and the court left it as is. 
181
supra note 180 above. 
182
see note 53, 257. 
183
see note 58, s134. and  also see note 83, para. 62.1.1-62.1.3  
184






 instantaneously declared that doctors and health professionals no 
longer needed to report consensual sexual conduct of adolescents below the age of 16 
years to authorities in terms of the Amendment Act.
 
 He drew this conclusion from the 




However this submission was vehemently criticised by Strode and Bhamjee 
187
 where an  
alternative approach was submitted by Strode and Bhamjee in that, McQuoid-Mason‟s 
argument failed to recognise the nuances of the approach taken by Rabie J in the Teddy 
Bear Clinic case and also that section 54 of SORMA was not amended.
188
 The argument 
raised by the above experts was that if the above submission was to be accepted then 
there would be no recognition given for certain forms of consensual sexual activity that is 
still illegal. Firstly in a matter where sexual activity is taking place between an adult and a 
child aged 12-15 years, secondly if the child is under the age of 12 years and if there is 





The relaxed provisions provided for after the Teddy Bear Clinic case still faces challenges 
as the judgement had raised many complexities. Namely, many adolescents aged between 
12 and 15  may have to disclose that they are sexually active with persons over the age of 
18 years.
190
 Moreover, younger adolescents that are between 12-15 may reveal sexual 
involvement with adolescents partners who are older by more than two years, for 
example, a 13 year old with a 16 year old.
191 
In addition, older adolescents, 16 or 17 year 
old may have to inform the health care worker that they are involved with children who 
are younger by more than two years.
192
 Health workers who do not take cognisance of the 
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Strode and Bhamjee submit that both researchers and health care providers still have a 
legal duty to report consensual sexual activity in certain circumstances and they have not 
been accorded any discretion in this regard, as opposed to McQuoid-Mason‟s 





The writer fully supports the submission of Strode and Bhamjee in that health care givers 
are required to still report certain sexual behaviour of children.
195
 State institutions are 
bound by Article 19 of the UNCRC
196 
whereby they have to take all appropriate 
legislative and social measures to protect children against any kind of abuse or degrading 
and inhumane treatment or punishment. Furthermore they are under a duty to protect 
children from sexual abuse or exploitation as per Article 27.
197
 Health care providers are 
subject to the above legislation but have to be mindful of the cases that are reported. 
Section 54 is now less mandatory but creates a difficulty as all situations that present 
themselves before the caregiver might appear suspicious. Additionally it is not the 
caregivers‟ task to conduct an investigation but the job of the trained detective from the 
Sexual Offences Unit.
198
 Moreover Rabie J specifically found that there was no need to 
address the constitutionality of section 54 (1)(a) of SORMA  dealing with mandatory 
reporting of sexual offences against adolescents and thus this section was to remain in 
force.
199 
 In light of the court‟s submission on this provision, it is an indication that this 
provision had not passed constitutional muster and will in the near future be challenged 
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see discussion in chapter 2, FCS Unit is a specialised unit within the SAPS that investigate sexual offences. All matters 
      
that present at a hospital or district surgeons rooms get reported to that unit of SAPS who can conduct an investigation. 
       However the argument is that it means child is faced with justice system again on the contrary not for consensual sex  
       but non-consensual which is punishable by the Act. 
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Summary of Arguments and Conclusion 
 
5.1 Introductory Remarks 
 
It has become abundantly clear throughout this dissertation that the writer is dealing with 
significant changes in legislation through the years due to defects in certain provisions. 
The writer has taken a journey through the Sexual Offences Act, which was repealed and 
replaced by SORMA. SORMA
 
came into operation in 2007 with an ambition to cure the 
defects of the Sexual Offences Act; however the lawmakers were again mistaken as 
provisions namely section 15 and 16 of SORMA pertaining to sexual penetration and 
sexual violation respectively, were challenged in court for its constitutionality and 
validity. The Teddy Bear Clinic case then arrived and threw the concept of consensual 
sexual conduct between adolescents aged 12-16 (Sections 15 and 16), into the spotlight 
and challenged the criminalisation of such conduct in the Constitutional Court and 
successfully achieved the defects to be corrected by amending legislation and this lead to 
the Amendment Act of 2015. 
 
This final chapter deals with the way forward now that the 
Amendment Act is law.  
 
 
5.2 Summary of arguments  
 
In this section, I recap on the previous chapters in order to bring it all together to 
emphasise that the new Amendment Act has aligned itself with the Constitutional Court‟s 
ruling. 
 
Legislation plays a crucial role in reacting to sexual violence in society. It is vital that the 
legislation governing sexual offences enables the criminal justice system to be more 
sensitised especially for child victims of sexual violence. SORMA was unique in that it 
paid attention to the most vulnerable population of the country, our children, in a whole 
chapter. Everyone applauded this legislation which extended the common law and 
professed to offer protection to all regardless of age or sex from criminal sexual acts 
however certain sections were flawed.
200 
 
In chapter two, specific focus is placed on these sections 15 and 16 of SORMA that 
criminalised consensual sexual activity between adolescents aged 12-16 years. Sexual 
offences legislation should be based on the rights of victims, as enshrined in the 
Constitution and likewise this would ensure that the rights are entrenched in legislation. 
The provisions was critically analysed and the following outcomes were made. Sections 
15 and 16 allowed state control into the intimate areas of adolescent‟s lives which 
 
29 
violated the rights to autonomy, privacy and dignity.
201  
Bearing this in mind, the writer is 
of the view that the provisions infringed on the rights of children. 
 
Child Right Activist then challenged the constitutionally of sections 15 and 16 of 
SORMA. Chapter 3 elaborates on the landmark case. The judgment was met with mixed 
feelings from parents and criticised by members of society. Parents were of the opinion 
that the court had lowered the age of consent and had encouraged promiscuity, 
notwithstanding the reality that sexual activity was common behaviour in growing up. It 
had become abundantly clear from all the research consulted in the form of academic 
writers, studies of the judgement and feedback received from the applicants (RAPCAN 
and Teddy Bear Clinic For Abused children), that the fears were unfounded. The 
judgment maintained that the age of consent remain at 16 years but decriminalised sexual 
activity that was deemed to be standard and regular behaviour of adolescents. 
 
The Constitutional Court ruling was sound and in line with the basic premises that the 
best interest of the child remains paramount in any decision concerning children. The 
writer agreed with the court‟s referral to The Minister of Welfare and Population 
Development v Fitzpatrick and Others where the Constitutional Court held that section 
28(2) protects children against undue exercise of authority. The manner in which the 
previous legislation was promulgated gave adults a right to „police‟ and regulates young 
people‟s sexual activity. The court had the writer‟s full admiration and support when it 
held that it was fundamentally irrational to state that adolescents did not have full 
capacity to make choices about their sexuality. 
 
Chapter 4 lead the discussion on the implementation of the Amendment Act. The 
Amendment Act received much support from various civil society groups. The drafters 
could be commended for effectively decriminalising consensual sexual activity between 
adolescents in accordance with the Constitutional Court ruling. Strode states that “the 
Amendment Act is a significant step forward for children‟s rights.”
203 
 The writer‟s view 
is that it had eased the tension between the Children‟s Act and SORMA by curing the 
defects with regards to section 134of the Children‟s Act and sections 15, 16 and 56(2)  of 
SORMA. 
 








Discussion under 2.3 
201
see discussion under 4.4. 
203





The Constitutional Court judgment should be commended for protecting the rights of 
children. Section 28(2) provides that a child‟s „best interests are of paramount importance 
in all matters concerning children. In Minister of Welfare v Fitzpatrick, the Constitutional 
Court held that section 28 protects children against the undue exercise of authority. This 
section of the Constitution read together with Flisher and Gevers, the expert witnesses, 
clearly indicated that the impugned provisions caused harm to children as they constituted 
an intrusion into the private relationships of children and subsequently violated 
fundamental constitutional rights. An analysis of sections 15 and 16 showed that the 
provisions did not balances children‟s rights to autonomy, dignity and capacity and for 
this reason was declared unconstitutional.  
 
 
The task of the lawmakers was then to ensure that they drafted a law aligned with the 
ruling. The amendments repealed sections 15 and 16 and replaced them with revised 
versions ensuring that the invalidity was limited to consensual sexual activity of 
adolescents between the ages of 12-15 years. The criminalisation of non-consensual sex 
such as unhealthy sexual behaviour that is behaviour that is unwanted, violent and unsafe 
was not affected. This is relevant to the fear that the age of consent had been lowered can 
be laid to rest as the age of consent remains 16 years in section 1 of the Amendment Act. 
Additionally the amendments do not encourage sexual promiscuity amongst children but 
says when they do they will not be treated as criminals. 
 
 
Moreover the lawmakers deserve equal applause for involving the situation of the „close-
in-age gap‟ into the equation. The Constitutional Court did not rule on this and left it to 
the discretion of the Executive. They complied and improved on the position of 16 and 17 
year olds who engage in consensual sexual conduct with an adolescent between the ages 
of 12-15 years, by limiting the offence and reporting obligation to when there is more 
than a two year age gap between them.  
 
 
In addition, the Amendment Act, however left the reporting obligations of health care 
professionals weighed in the balance and found wanting. Health care workers have been 
eased of some responsibility but not in its entirety. The requirement to report the child‟s 
behaviour isolated the child and also made it impossible for the caregiver to perform his 
or her duty of giving advice. When matters are presented to them, they have to still 
interview children to establish if the matter requires reporting and they have to be vigilant 
against finding themselves in the same situation prior to the court case. So although the 
drafters of this legislation went over and above the ruling, this aspect would surely face 
challenges and will inevitably land up before the courts. 
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It is my view that upon analysis of the amendments as discussed in chapter 4, that the 
relevant impugned provisions were amended in accordance with the constitutional 
requirements. This chapter ends with recommendations that I feel with pave the way for 







In light of the above paragraph under the conclusion, the following is recommended. 
Health care providers and the police investigating sexual offences and social workers 
have and should continue to work closely together. The reason is that all these role 
players should assist when a situation of alleged abuse or unsafe sex, or unwanted sex 
arises and is presented at the hospital. The policy that all come on board as a multi-
sectoral entity so that the child can receive professional help rather than just be „shoved‟ 
into the system. It is suggested that the health professional await information from the 
police if a case docket is too opened or not.    
 
 
Everyone agrees that the need to be open and honest about teenage sexuality and to allow 
young people to make truly informed choices as to when they will start exploring and 
eventually have sex. We therefore cannot use the justice system as a „weapon‟ to control 
our children‟s sexuality when we do not approve of their relationships as this will 
marginalise them. It is suggested that more education be introduced into schools life 
orientation classes and workshops by the police and health departments to increase 
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